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This paper evaluates whether trade liberalization in Colombia in 1990-91
increased market integration in 12 commodities that account for some 70
percent of agricultural GDP.  Empirical results indicate that for all crops
examined, the nature of integration relationships between local and world prices
was not altered by reforms. Cotton and cocoa prices retained a high level of
association with international markets. Rice, soybeans, oil palm, bananas, and
coffee continued to exhibit only some degree of short-term integration but prices
continue to diverge from world trends in the long-run.  Maize and beef only
displayed long-run integration. On the other hand, sugar and sorghum have
preserved prices that are effectively isolated from external markets. Generally,
results suggest that the majority of tradable agricultural commodities in Colombia
have not exhibited high degrees of integration with world markets. This has
continued in the post-liberalization period due to the combined effect of strong
lobbying groups and policies that have tended to stabilize and/or protect
domestic markets, including price bands, import controls, and purchasing
agreements with processors.
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THE LINK BETWEEN FARMGATE AND WORLD PRICES IN THE
WAKE OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
THE CASE OF COLOMBIA
1.  Introduction
One of the key objectives of economy-wide reforms implemented throughout Latin America
since the mid-1980s was the elimination of barriers to trade. Despite strong political resistance,
most countries extended trade liberalization to agricultural markets.  Hence, greater integration
between domestic and world agricultural markets was expected.
In Colombia, trade reforms were implemented between 1990 and 1991.  Originally announced as
a four-year program of tariff reduction, programmed cuts were accelerated at the end of 1991.  A
new substantially lower tariff schedule was in place by early 1992.  Producers’ associations of
grains and oilseeds opposed trade reforms, largely because they had obtained substantial
benefits from pre-1990 policies, which had emphasized protection, self-sufficiency and price
stabilization (García and Montes, 1988).  Government intervention guaranteed minimum returns
and sheltered farmers from world market volatility.  In contrast, producers of exportable crops—
such as coffee, bananas and flowers—supported reforms. They expected direct benefits from
reduced tariffs on imported inputs and elimination of indirect taxation, implicit in the pre-reform
regime.
1
In theory, the new regime should have increased transmission of world market signals to local
producers. However, post-liberalization interventions may have obstructed integration.  On the
one hand, trade liberalization was accompanied by the creation of a variable tariff scheme—
known as the price band system—in eight politically sensitive crops. On the other hand,
liberalization was followed by a profound agricultural crisis in 1992, caused by currency
appreciation, tariff reductions, acute drought conditions and falling world commodity prices
(Jaramillo  and Junguito, 1993). The crisis prompted the government to adopt a number of ad hoc
measures to restrict exposure to international competition in selected crops. Such measures
included pressures on local processors to purchase crops at pre-arranged prices, minimum
import prices and modifications of the price band methodology. Despite these measures, the
value of agricultural imports has grown at a record pace—27 percent annually—between 1990
and 1996.
This study evaluates the extent to which structural change has occurred in the integration of
Colombian agricultural markets as a result of the 1990-91 reforms.  Econometric tests are
developed that take into account the special time series characteristics of agricultural prices.
These tests are put in practice with annual data for the period 1970-1997 for 12 crops that
account for about 70 percent of agricultural GDP.  Crops examined include important export
commodities (coffee, bananas, cotton, cocoa and sugar), importables (sorghum, maize,
soybeans, palm oil and wheat) and activities in which Colombia has historically been self-
sufficient (i.e., rice and beef).
In the next section, a brief account of recent policies that affect market integration in Colombian
agricultural markets is presented.  The third section discusses benefits and drawbacks of
                                                       
1   Krueger et al. (1992) describe how indirect taxation of exportable crops arises with tariff-protection of
industrial sectors.3
empirical methodologies used in the literature to evaluate market integration.  The fourth section
presents econometric results.  Some conclusions are drawn in the final section.
2.  The Trade Policy Regime for Agricultural Crops in Colombia
The agricultural policy regime adopted in Colombia starting in the 1950s was not favorable to the
transmission of international price signals to domestic producers.
2 The protectionist policy regime
was based on the government’s ability to regulate import flows.  Policy makers established prices
at planting time for most cereals and oilseeds and regulated the flow of imports to achieve price
objectives.  In some cases, controls included agreements with processors, who were required to
purchase local harvests at pre-arranged prices in order to obtain access to imports. Another
important instrument was direct purchases at support prices by IDEMA, the parastatal in charge
of agricultural marketing.
Coffee, the main export crop, was subject to a complex taxation system.
3 Non-traditional exports
benefited greatly from a renewed emphasis on export promotion, initiated in 1967.  Bananas,
sugar, beef and cotton obtained export subsidies as well as subsidized interest rates to finance
exports.
4  For the case of cotton, policies supported a scheme that attempted to guarantee a
steady supply of domestic fiber to textile industries.
Starting in 1990, significant structural changes were implemented in agricultural and trade
policies, as part of general deregulation and market liberalization reforms. The policy regime for
import-competing crops was dismantled between 1990 and 1991, when the government
launched liberalization reforms centered in the elimination of barriers to trade flows.  According
to this plan,  all sectors of the economy were to be exposed to international competition.  Trade
reform was initiated in October 1990 with the elimination of a large share of permit requirements
and other non-tariff barriers for all crops except grains and oilseeds.  In 1991, a plan was
announced to reduce gradually average tariffs from 38.6 percent to 11 percent in four years, with
a slower reduction rate for import-competing agricultural goods. However, all non-tariff barriers
were eliminated for grains and oilseeds, as well as the virtual monopoly on grain imports held by
IDEMA.
The opposition of some producers’ association to reforms and government concerns about its
impact on some politically sensitive crops led to the creation of the price band regime in mid-
1991.  Bands were designed to produce variable tariffs that would filter out extreme price
variations from world market signals for eight politically sensitive crops, namely, wheat, barley,
rice, maize, sorghum, soybeans, oil palm, milk and sugar.
Falling profitability for farmers generated strong pressure for compensatory measures starting in
mid-1992.  Initially, the government announced IDEMA purchases for cereals and oilseeds,
higher protection for the maize and sorghum price bands, refinancing facilities and a continuation
of export subsidies for bananas, sugar cane and flowers (Jaramillo, 1994).  In May of 1993, the
government announced a “Reactivation Plan.”  This plan included funds to finance IDEMA
purchases, minimum import prices,  modifications of the price band methodology to increase
protection of substitutes and by-products, lowered tariffs for agricultural inputs, the creation of a
safeguard statute, and a temporary ban on imports of chicken parts and powdered milk,
5
                                                       
2   The pre-1990 agricultural policy regime is described in detail in García and Montes (1988), Machado
(1985) and Jaramillo (1994).
3   The complex system of coffee taxes is described in Junguito and Pizano (1997).
4   These subsidies were initially known as Certificados de Abono Tributario (CAT) and in the 1980s were
transformed into CERTs.
5   The prohibition on milk imports was in force from July 1993 to February 1994.  The prohibition of
shipments of chicken parts was substituted in January of 1995 by a prohibitive tariff resulting from the
operation of the Andean price band.4
extension of export subsidies to non-traditional crops, further refinancing facilities, subsidies for
investment in agricultural infrastructure and an emergency rural employment plan. A new
administration reinstated compulsory agreements between producers and agroindustrial firms in
1995.
In 1996, the government and rice producers agreed to a new policy regime based on a strict
control of imports.  A policy committee was created to decide import quota volumes, with the
participation of the government, millers, producers and traders. Since then, the committee has
banned imports of white rice, limited the flow of imports to maintain a stable real price to farmers
and granted a monopoly of imports to selected millers and traders.  The government has also
provided funds for a new rice storage subsidy since 1996.
The direct effects of the reforms of 1990-91 were negligible for exportable crops.  Nevertheless,
falling world prices and exchange rate appreciation depressed sharply real prices of coffee,
bananas and cotton.
3.  Methodology
The relationship between world prices of agricultural commodities and producer prices has been
the subject of some controversy.  With data set for a large set of commodities and countries,
studies by Hazell et al. (1990) and Quiroz and Soto (1993) concluded that transmission tends to
be low, and often non-existent.  Both studies suggest that governments across countries have a
propensity to undertake interventions that stabilize and isolate domestic prices from external
influences.  For the case of Colombia, a study by Rueda (1995) yielded similar conclusions for
six importable crops in the 1970-92 period. On the other hand, a study for 58 countries by
Mundlak and Larson (1990) found that for virtually all cases producer prices move closely with
world prices.  The study concluded that while governments may intervene in domestic markets,
these actions do not seem to obstruct the transmission of signals from external sources.
At the heart of the debate there is an important discussion about the most appropriate
econometric methods to test market integration.
6  The bulk of the early literature, tested for
integration by examining price changes and calculating simple correlations.  Other studies,
including those by Mundlak and Larson (1992), Isard (1997) and Richardson (1978), estimated
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where pt
d and pt
w denote the domestic and world prices of commodity under consideration, m and
b are parameters to be estimated, and et is the error term. The studies tested the “Law of One
Price” hypothesis, by testing whether the coefficient b was equal to one and the intercept was
zero (Ho: m+1= b = 1).  Alternatively, tests were performed of whether the price differential (pt
d -
pt
w) was white noise.
Subsequent analyses have shown that estimating (1) and testing the hypotheses described
presents two problems. First, it is unlikely that trade and other public policies in commodity
markets will lead to a constant zero intercept, required for the null hypothesis to be accepted and
for the true price differential to be white noise. Therefore, tests may reject the null, even where
there is a strong relationship between international and domestic prices.
The second problem deals with the time-series properties of the series involved. If international
and domestic prices are non-stationary, it is not possible to make valid inferences about the
                                                       
6   A review of the methodological debate appears in Fackler (1997).5
parameters in relationship (1). Deaton and Laroque (1992) have shown that agricultural prices
tend to follow non-stationary processes.
Usually, it is possible to deal with non-stationarity by estimating cointegration relationships.
However, use of this methodology may lead to additional problems.
7 Ardeni (1989) estimated (1)
with a data set of agricultural commodities and found that the error terms were non-stationary.
He argued that this was evidenced against the Law of One Price. However, using the same data




Inferences about the distribution of (pt
d -pt
w) are better grounded in recent econometric advances
than testing for (1).  However, this test cannot answer important questions about the speed of
adjustment in the transmission relationship.  To tackle this issue, Baffes (1997) suggested a
simple but practical methodology.  It begins by considering the dynamic revised version of (1)
proposed by Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984):
 (2) 
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where m and bi (i=1,2,3) are parameters to be estimated, and nt denotes the error term. Using
this model, the non-stationarity problem may be resolved as well as the restrictive nature of (1).
Imposing a homogeneity restriction, (2) can be expressed as an Error Correction Model (ECM):
9
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where a=1-b2  and t=b1 . In this relationship, inferences about the parameters will be valid if the
differenced series are stationary. Moreover, (3) allows for a useful economic interpretation of
parameters. t indicates how much of a given change in the world price of the commodity is
transmitted to the domestic price in the current period (short-run effect). a indicates how much of
the past differential between domestic and world prices is eliminated in the following period (i.e.,
error correction coefficient). Values of t and a near one reflect rapid adjustment of domestic
prices to variation in world prices.
                                                       
7 For example, if the estimate of b is less than one, the price differential will grow across time, even when
price movements are proportional.
8 Baffes used an alternative way to check if the relationship between prices is one to one, by testing for
unit roots in the following univariate process (Engel and Yoo (1987)):
       (pt
d -pt
w) ~ I(0)
which is equivalent to assuming a unit cointegration vector between the prices without imposing the m=0
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Taking the expected value and under ideal conditions (et~(0,s
2)), the result is E(pt
d -pt
w) = E(m).
9 Without the homogeneity restriction, the relationship is:
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With the parameters estimated in this regression, it is possible to test three hypothesis: (a) If b1= b3=0,
then the markets are segmented; (b) if b1+b2+b3=1, the homogeneity restriction is valid and the markets
are integrated in the long run; and (c) if b1=1, b3=b2=0, the integration is short run. Note that the
homogeneity condition implies that a long relationship between the prices exists and thus (pt
d -pt
w) ~ I(0).6
The dynamic model described can be used to estimate the amount of adjustment that has
occurred after any given period of time (Baffes, 1997). In the current period, n=0, the amount of
adjustment (k) takes the value of the short-run parameter t, which can also be expressed as
k=1-(1-t). In period n=1, k takes the value of t+(1-t)a, which can be decomposed into the effect
of the previous period (t), and the feedback effect, ((1-t)a) or 1-(1-t)(1-a).  Following the
geometric sequence, the amount of adjustment after n periods is:
(4)
n k ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 a t - - - =
For values of t and a close to one, a small number of periods are required for a total adjustment
of the domestic price. If t=1, total adjustment is attained in the current period, while if a =1,
complete adjustment is achieved by the second period.
Finally, relationship (3) also allows testing for structural break from policy reform, the central aim
of this study. The test simply involves estimation of an unrestricted version of (3) in which
parameters area allowed to vary across pre and post-reform periods.  An F-test can then be
formulated to test jointly whether parameters are equal across sub-periods.
4. Results
Annual international and producer price series were obtained for the 1970-97 period for rice,
maize, sorghum, wheat, soybeans, palm oil, cotton, sugar, coffee, bananas, beef and cocoa (see
Figure 1).  In aggregate, these products account for about 70 percent of agricultural GDP.  World
prices are taken from monthly series from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Producer
prices were assembled from diverse sources, including producers’ associations, the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Wholesale Price Index. For the case of coffee, domestic and international
prices were obtained directly from the Federation of Coffee Growers.  Prior to the analysis, all
prices were converted to local currency and deflated by the Colombian CPI.
10
To determine the order of integration of the series, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron tests were conducted (See Appendix Table 1) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Phillips and
Perron, 1988). With the exception of producer prices of rice,
11 all price series were found to be
integrated of order one and the differenced series are stationary.
12
Preliminary Evidence
Figure 2 displays NPCs for all commodities
examined from 1970 to 1997. Increased
integration should result in constant NPCs,
that reflect stable non-prohibitive tariffs
(Quiroz and Soto, 1993). Visual inspection
does not reveal a general flattening out of
protection levels after 1991. Stabilization of
                                                       
10   For calculation of NPCs and regression estimates, world prices were converted into border prices by
adjusting for international freight, insurance and port handling charges.
11  The awkward result for rice may be related to the special policy regime for this crop that has implicitly
aimed to maintain a relatively constant level of producer prices.
12 A test of the stationarity of the price differential between domestic and world prices was also performed
using ADF and PP statistics (not included).  Generally, tests using annual data  find that stationarity can
be rejected for maize, sorghum and coffee.  For the remainder, the null hypothesis is accepted, although
significance levels are low in some cases.  With semi-annual data, yields two differences in test results.
Stationarity is rejected only for the case of maize.  Also, significance levels of acceptance of the
stationarity hypothesis increase substantially.
TABLE 1  Coefficients of Variation of Relative Prices, 1970-96
Commodity 70A-90B 91A-96B F-statistic
a
Rice 26.7 17.5 1.77
Maize 37.8 9.4 11.21
Sorghum 27.4 16.2 2.32
Wheat 26.0 20.9 1.77
Soybeans 35.6 17.2 3.46
Palm 27.3 6.7 41.40
Cotton 21.1 13.5 2.56
Sugar 35.0 17.8 2.05
Coffee 19.1 16.2 0.87
Beef 28.8 25.4 0.79
aTest of equality of CVs across sub-periods.  Null is no change.
95% critical value 5% F(41,11)=4.2
Coefficient of Variation (%)7
NPC levels after 1991 seems to occur only for cocoa. This is reflected in a large amount of
covariation of world and domestic prices in the post-reform period (see Figure 1).  On the other
hand, sugar and rice display upward trends in protection after 1991, corresponding to widening
gaps between producer and world prices.  By contrast, palm, soybeans and wheat exhibit
downward trends in NPCs in the post-reform sample, confirming the convergence tendency of
world and domestic prices after 1991 detected in Figure 1.  For coffee, cotton, bananas, beef,
sorghum and  maize, NPC levels seem to have maintained a high degree of volatility after 1991,
displaying no clear tendency for prices to move in unison.
Table 1 displays coefficients of variation (CV) of domestic price relative to world price for all
crops.  If markets displayed greater integration after reforms, relative prices would tend to
stabilize around a value of one and the CV would be expected to fall near zero.  However, for
most crops, CVs continue to display similar levels of variability of relative prices before and after
reforms. Formal tests for changes in CV levels after 1991 indicate that variability has decreased
only in the cases of maize and oil palm (see Table 1).
Econometric Results
Table 2 presents results of estimating relationship (3) for each crop for the restricted model, i.e.,
excluding the possibility of post-reform structural change. The only crops for which the short and
long-run coefficients are both significant are cotton, cocoa and wheat. Particularly, for the case
of cotton, it is found that a change of $10 in the world price in terms of local currency results in
an adjustment of $3.4 in the current period and $1.37 in the following period.  As a result, after
three years, 95 percent of world price variations are transmitted to domestic prices. Short and
long-term responses are somewhat lower than for cocoa and wheat. Changes in world prices
lead to corresponding responses in current producer prices of 34 and 26 percent in cocoa and
wheat, respectively. Three-year adjustment is 69 percent for cocoa and 71% for wheat.
By contrast, for the case of rice, soybeans, bananas, oil palm and coffee, only the short-term
coefficient is significant. Short-term responses in local prices range from a low of 17 percent in
oil palm to 39 percent in bananas. In these crops, the lack of significance of the adjustment
coefficient implies that remaining differences are never adjusted and domestic and local price
levels diverge in the long-run.
For maize and beef, the long-term coefficient is significant—22 and 10 percent—but no short-
term integration is detected.  The size of the three-year adjustment is 53 and 25 percent,
respectively. This suggests that local prices tend to respond with a lag to world price variations
and that both price series are cointegrated with world prices.8
Finally, sugar and sorghum are two crops where not statistically meaningful short or long-run
relationships are found. Local prices do not seem to respond to fluctuations in international
markets.
To test whether structural reforms had any impact on the degree of integration, the unrestricted
model was estimated for all products, with 1991 as the year for the structural break (see Table
3).
13  F-tests for structural change do not detect any changes in short or long-run integration after
1991.
In summary, empirical results indicate that after reforms none of the 12 commodities studied
increased their level of integration with world markets.  Three crops continued to exhibit strong
integration, five only short-term responses, two displayed long-term integration and two remained
isolated from world market trends.
                                                       
13 Initially, the model was estimated allowing for structural change in the constant in relationship (5).
Since results did not detect that the constant was significantly different from zero, the model was re-
estimated allowing only changes in the transmission parameters.
Table  2.  Restricted Model, 1970-1997
Adjustment Short-run R 3-year
Commodity Constant Coeff. Effect Squared DW Adjustment
a
Rice 288.7 0.04 0.32 0.33 2.53 32%
(-0.08) (-0.72) (3.37)***
Maize 843.1 0.22 0.08 0.17 2.78 53%
(-0.42) (2.23)** (-0.35)
Sorghum -717.0 0.08 0.09 0.07 2.61 0%
(-0.60) (-1.28) (-0.51)
Wheat -511.9 0.27 0.26 0.43 1.17 71%
(-0.37) (3.49)*** (2.21)**
Soybeans -1744.2 0.10 0.24 0.22 1.93 24%
(-0.78) (-1.57) (2.24)**
Palm oil -5090.8 0.06 0.17 0.11 2.04 17%
(-1.15) (-0.69) (1.74)*
Cotton 34768.7 0.34 0.81 0.47 2.45 95%
(-1.13) (2.27)** (4.03)***
Cocoa -19977.3 0.22 0.34 0.79 2.52 69%
(-2.97)*** (5.31)*** (8.97)***
Sugar 607.3 0.02 0.01 0.14 2.13 5%
(-0.77) (1.95)* -0.64
Coffee -25850.0 0.11 0.35 0.62 2.47 35%
(-0.96) (-1.34) (6.07)***
Beef -19933.9 0.1 0.07 0.15 1.76 25%
(-1.41) (2.00)** (0.07)
Bananas 93.5 0.15 0.39 0.34 2.46 39%
(-0.05) (-1.09) (3.51)***
T-stats in parenthesis.  Significance levels *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
a Calculated using only significant parameters.9
Analysis
The empirical evidence presented suggests strongly that recent trade liberalization in agricultural
markets in Colombia has not resulted in generalized changes in market integration between local
and world prices. None of the 12 commodities studied displayed significant changes in
integration levels after reforms.
Since 1970, minor exportable crops such as cotton and cocoa have exhibited relatively high
integration with world markets.  For these crops, no changes were detected in integration levels
after reforms.  This result is not surprising for cocoa, where government interventions have been
virtually non-existent before and after reforms.  The finding also indicates that attempts to
protect cotton growers after the 1992 crisis have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful, as reflected
in the sharp drop in output levels between 1990 and 1997.
Crops that have traditionally been associated with strong political lobbies—including rice, oil
palm, sugar, coffee, beef and bananas—have managed to avoid substantial changes in the
degree of transmission of world price signals as well as in the relative volatility of producer
prices.  A powerful lobby of producers and processors may explain why sugar has managed to
remain isolated from world market trends, by obtaining special protection and stabilization
treatment from price bands. Similarly, rice, soybeans, oil palm, bananas, and coffee have
displayed only  partial short-term integration but substantial divergence between world and local
prices in the long-term.  For the case of rice, the absence of post-reform changes is clearly
reflected in the large amount of compensatory measures extracted from the government after
1991, including price bands and substantial import restrictions.  For soybeans and oil palm, weak
integration after reforms is the likely result of price bands. For bananas, local prices have been
affected by export subsidies and other government measures to cushion falling prices since
Table  3.  Unrestricted Model, Reform Period Starts in 1991
Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period
Adjustment Short-run 3-year Adjustment Short-run 3-year R 
Commodity Constant Coeff. Effect Adjustment
a Coeff. Effect Adjustment
a Squared
Rice -579.8 0.06 0.32 32% -0.11 0.34 32% 0.33
(-0.13) (-1.8) (3.17)*** (-0.49) (-0.04)
Maize 1276 0.21 -0.03 51% 0.24 0.53 51% 0.21
(0.58)* (2.08)** (-0.13) (-0.07) (-1.01)
Sorghum -127.8 0.05 0.01 0% 0.23 0.28 0% 0.1
(-0.09) (-0.67) (-0.03) (-0.58) (-0.67)
Wheat 314.8 0.24 0.24 66% 0.65 0.35 66% 0.48
(-0.21) (2.87)*** (2.01)** (-1.33) (-0.26)
Soybeans -132.3 0.07 0.19 19% 0.29 0.89 19% 0.32
(-0.05) (-1.11) (1.77)* (-0.34) (-1.42)
Palm oil -4790.7 0.06 0.18 18% -0.08 -0.23 18% 0.13
(-0.96) (-0.65) (1.74)* (-0.30) (-0.62)
Cotton 43468 0.36 0.82 95% 1.07 0.81 95% 0.47
(-1.17) (2.18)** (3.58)*** (-0.64) (-0.01)
Cocoa -22723.9 0.22 0.34 69% 0.98 0.92 69% 0.81
(-3.22)*** (5.42)*** (9.04)*** (-1.63) (-1.27)
Sugar 809.6 0.02 0.01 5% 0.03 0.07 5% 0.15
(-0.85) (1.78)* -0.54 (-0.23) (-0.54)
Coffee -34467 0.11 0.32 32% 0.39 0.65 65% 0.69
(-1.28) (-1.42) (5.51)*** (-1.08) (2.07)**
Beef -23737.2 0.1 0.09 27% 0.08 -0.06 27% 0.17
(-1.49) (1.98)** (1.09) (0.08) (-0.45)
Bananas 745.9 0.15 0.31 31% 0.62 0.74 31% 0.39
(-0.41) (-1.06) (2.32)** (-0.54) (-1.08)
T-stats in parenthesis.  Significance levels *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
a Calculated using only significant parameters.10
1992. For coffee, results confirm that no substantive changes in the stabilization policies
supported by the National Coffee Fund have occurred after 1991.
Maize is a crop with a weaker lobbying group which has gained only short-term isolation.
However, local prices tend to follow world trends in the long-run.  This is the expected result of
price bands, which seem to have closely substituted for prior policy instruments that provided
only short-term isolation. For the case of beef, results reflect the importance of domestic factors
in determining short-term price variations for a product in which Colombia is essentially self-
sufficient. The presence of hoof and mouth disease has kept Colombian beef out of major
markets, but the finding of long-term integration indicates that marginal amounts of exports and
imports have kept domestic prices connected to world price trends.
5.   Conclusions
This paper has evaluated whether trade liberalization reforms in Colombia in 1990-91 were
associated with a structural change in market integration in 12 commodities that account for
some 70 percent of agricultural GDP.  Empirical results did not suggest greater integration after
reforms for any of the crops under study.
Before and after reforms, cotton, wheat and cocoa retained a high level of association of
producer and international prices. Rice, soybeans, bananas, oil palm and coffee exhibit varying
degrees of short-term integration but prices continue to diverge from world trends in the long-run.
Maize and beef only exhibit long-run integration.  On the other hand, sugar and sorghum have
remained effectively isolated from world price changes.
Empirical results suggest that the majority of tradable agricultural commodities in Colombia have
not exhibited high degrees of integration with world markets in the 1970-97 period.  This result
seems consistent with stabilization and import substitution policies prevalent in the pre-1990
period.  However, this result does not seem consistent with the expected results of trade
liberalization reforms after 1990.  For most crops, it is likely that the combined effect of strong
lobbying groups and policies that have tended to stabilize and/or protect domestic markets—
including price bands, import controls, and harvest purchase agreements—after the 1992
production crisis have neutralized the expected effect of liberalization.11
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Figure 1 Domestic and International Prices (Pesos of 1990)
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